Architectural Support for Designing Fault-Tolerant Open Distributed Systems by Hariri, Salim et al.
Syracuse University 
SURFACE 
Electrical Engineering and Computer Science College of Engineering and Computer Science 
1992 
Architectural Support for Designing Fault-Tolerant Open 
Distributed Systems 
Salim Hariri 
Syracuse University 
Alok Choudhary 
Syracuse University 
Behcet Sarikaya 
Bilkent University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://surface.syr.edu/eecs 
 Part of the Computer Engineering Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Hariri, Salim; Choudhary, Alok; and Sarikaya, Behcet, "Architectural Support for Designing Fault-Tolerant 
Open Distributed Systems" (1992). Electrical Engineering and Computer Science. 83. 
https://surface.syr.edu/eecs/83 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Engineering and Computer Science at 
SURFACE. It has been accepted for inclusion in Electrical Engineering and Computer Science by an authorized 
administrator of SURFACE. For more information, please contact surface@syr.edu. 
Architectural Support for 
Designing Fault-Tolerant 
Open Distributed Systems 
Salim Hariri and Alok Choudhary, Syracuse University 
Behcet Sarikaya, Bilkent University 
A distributed voting 
algorithm and a two- 
level hierarchy for 
permanent memory are 
key elements in this 
scheme for supporting 
fault tolerance in open 
distributed systems. 
distributed system consists of autonomous computing modules that inter- 
act with each other using messages. Designing distributed systems is more 
difficult than designing centralized systems for several reasons. Physical 
separation and the use of heterogeneous computers complicate interprocessor 
communication, management of resources, synchronization of cooperating activ- 
ities, and maintenance of consistency among multiple copies of information. The 
main advantages of distributed systems include increased fault-tolerance capabil- 
ities through the inherent redundancy of resources, improved performance by 
concurrently executing a single task on several computing modules, resource 
sharing, and the ability to adapt to a changing environment (extensibility).’ 
Distributed systems cover a wide range of applications. Recent advances in 
VLSI devices and network technology will further increase the use of distributed 
systems. As the complexity of these systems increases, so does the probability of 
component failure, which can adversely affect the performance and usefulness of 
such systems. Thus, reliability, availability, and fault tolerance become important 
design issues in distributed systems. Fault tolerance is the system’s ability to 
continue executing despite the occurrence of failures. Increasing the reliability and 
fault tolerance of a system involves a trade-off between the cost of failure (for 
example, costs incurred by incomplete or incorrect computations) and the cost of 
incorporating redundancy and recovery mechanisms. 
Because of their inherent redundancy, distributed systems provide a cost- 
effective way to apply fault-tolerance techniques. Open distributed systems pro- 
vide universal connectivities among their components because their designs are 
based on the standard protocols adopted by the International Standards Organi- 
zation (ISO). In this computing environment, interacting processes communicate 
through messages that traverse a stack of software layers. Consequently, applying 
fault-tolerance techniques to execute critical tasks can be costly in terms of 
execution time. 
In this article, we first provide an overview of the main techniques for designing 
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fault-tolerant software and hard- 
ware systems. We identify the 
important features of the build- 
ing blocks (computers, memo- 
ries, buses, etc.) that can sup- 
port an efficient implementation 
of fault-tolerant open distribut- 
ed systems (FTODS). Taking 
into account the features of these 
building blocks, we propose an 
organization for FTODS. In 
FTODS, the algorithms needed 
for transferring files and syn- 
chronizing the concurrent activ- 
ities of the computing modules 
- and for recovery - are IS0 
standard protocols. We propose 
the use of low-level voting and 
recovery algorithms that can run 
as a layer of software above the 
operating system to make the 
open distributed system an at- 
tractive environment for apply- 
ing fault-tolerant techniques. 
Design 
considerations for 
fault tolerance 
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the design to concurrently mask faults 
and prevent their propagation to other 
modules. The most common example of 
static redundancy is the triple modular 
redundant system. Another approach 
Fault tolerance, a system’s ability to for providing fault tolerance is dynamic 
continue executing its tasks despite the redundancy, which uses spare compo- 
occurrence of failures, can be achieved nents to replace faulty modules once 
by fault masking. Masking (also called they are detected. Still another approach 
static redundancy) is incorporated into - a combination of these two, called 
Strategies for designing fault-tolerant computers 
Many techniques have been used to build fault-tolerant 
computers. They include 
Fault masking: Concurrent masking and correction of gen- 
erated errors. 
Fault defe@o#: Use of hardware and software mechanisms 
to determine the Qccurrence of a failure. Fault detection 
mechanisms include concurrent fault detection, stepwise com- 
parison, and periodic testing to determine whether computers 
or communication links are operating correctly. 
Fault containment: Prevents propagatlun of errQneQus or 
damaged information In the system after a fault occurs and 
before it is detected. 
F&t diagnosis: t&cates and identifies the faulty module re- 
sponsible for a detected error. 
Repair/recontisuration: Eliminates or replaces the faulty 
module, or provides means to bypass it. 
Fault recovery Corrects the system to a state acceptable 
for continued operation. 
Most of these techniques have been used to build such 
computers as the Tandem 16 NonStop system, the Stratus 
hybrid redundancy - applies 
static and dynamic redundancy 
to achieve fault tolerance. In 
general, the design of a fault- 
tolerant computer involves one 
or more of the following strate- 
gies: fault masking, fault detec- 
tion, fault containment, fault 
diagnosis, repairlreconfigura- 
tion, and fault recovery2 (see 
the sidebar “Strategies for de- 
signing fault-tolerant comput- 
ers”). 
Designing a fault-tolerant dis- 
tributed system is more involved 
than designing a fault-tolerant 
centralized system. Two main 
problems must be addressed 
during design: 
(1) Concurrency control, 
which involves scheduling con- 
current execution of tasks on 
different nodes such that their 
results are identical to a serial 
execution of the tasks (serializ- 
ability requirement). 
(2) Kedundancy management, which 
involves preserving consistency among 
replicated resources and maintaining 
the state information with backup mod- 
ules to support recovery. 
Transactions are an important pro- 
gramming paradigm for simplifying the 
design of reliable distributed applica- 
computer system, the VAXft 3000, the Teradata and Sequoia 
systems, the fault-tolerant multiprocessor (FTMP), the soft- 
ware-impfemented fault-toterance (SIFT) system, and AT&T’s 
Electronic Switch System (ESS).ls The effectiveness of fault- 
tolerance techniques can be measured by the “coverage,” de- 
fined as the conditional probability of recwering from a fautt 
once it occurs.3 It Is difficult to measure this param&X be- 
cause it involves evaluating the probability that fauft detec- 
tion, fault diagnosis, repairlrrrconfiguration, and recovery al- 
gorithms are aperating correctly. 
References 
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trol can be centralized or decentralized, 
Transactions depending on whether the voting is done 
at one site or multiple sites.’ In addition 
to maintaining consistency of replicat- 
A transaction can be defined as a collection of operations having the following 
three properties’: 
ed resources, redundancy management 
is responsible for system recovery in the 
Failure atomicify: Either all operations are performed successfully or their re- 
suits are undone when a failure occurs. 
presence of node crashes and communi- 
cation link failures. 
Permanence: The results of committed transactions will not be lost. 
Serializability: The results of executing transactions concurrently are the same 
as if they were executed serially. 
Use of the transaction concept to model distributed computations provides a 
convenient means to solve the concurrency control and redundancy management 
problems.’ The concurrency control problem consists of three tasks: assigning an 
order to all transactions, identifying conflicting transactions, and synchronizing 
transactions to resolve the identified conflicts. Basically, there are three ap- 
proaches to concurrency control: time-stamp-based schemes, locking protocols, 
and optimistic techniques.2 
References 
1, Distributed Systems, S. Mullender, ed., Addison-Wesley, Reading, Mass., 1989. 
2. P.A. Bernstein, V. Hadzilacos, and N. Goodman, Concurrency Control and Recovery in 
Database Systems, Addison-Wesley, Reading, Mass., 1987. 
tions (see the “Transactions” sidebar). 
Techniques for managing redundancy 
and maintaining consistency of repli- 
cated objects are broadly character- 
ized as centralized- and decentralized- 
control algorithms. The centralized- 
control approach supports strong con- 
sistency, requirements and prevents 
deadlocks, but it is susceptible to single 
points of failure. The decentralized-con- 
trol approach supports weak 
consistency requirements 
(when it is permissible to 
have the state of some rep- 
lica out of date for a short 
period of time), and there- 
fore it can potentially in- 
crease a system’s through- 
put. The primary-copy 
algorithm’ applies the cen- 
tralized-control strategy to 
ensure the consistency of 
replicated resources. In this 
scheme. one node is desig- 
nated as the primary node 
and made responsible for 
serializing updates. When 
the update values have been 
computed, the primary node 
broadcasts them to all oth- 
er nodes in the system. The 
primary node then waits to 
receive acknowledgments 
Voting algorithms have also been used 
to ensure consistency of replicated re- 
sources. In this scheme, managers of 
replicated resources use a common set 
of rules to determine whether an up- 
date can be made. The algorithm’s con- 
layered architecture.’ IS0 committees 
are working on an architecture in line 
with the reference model for open dis- 
tributed processing (ODP). This effort 
aims to combine the OS1 model with a 
database model to arrive at a global 
framework for designing distributed 
systems. In such an environment, any 
computer would be open for communi- 
cation and could be integrated easily 
with the existing distributed systems to 
perform certain tasks. Implementation 
of the communication protocols as lay- 
ered software tends to be very slow and 
consequently limits the scope of appli- 
cations for open distrr%ut- 
ed systems. 
Figure 1. The structure of an application layer. 
The application layer is 
implemented as several ap- 
plication service elements 
(ASEs), with one ASE 
serving them all. This ele- 
ment is called the associa- 
tion control service element 
(ACSE). and it provides 
association (connection) es- 
tablishment/disconnection 
service to other ASEs. In 
open distributed systems, 
distributedapplicationsare 
implemented by the servic- 
es that the ASEs provide. 
The application layer ser- 
vices can be in the form of 
file transfers using the 
FTAM (file transfer and 
management) protocol, re- 
mote database access using 
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from all nodes before processing the 
next transaction. The main problem with 
this scheme is that it permits no paral- 
lelism among transaction executions. 
Open distributed 
systems 
In this article, we investigate tech- 
niques for providing architectural sup- 
port to improve the execution of dis- 
tributed applications that use the Open 
Systems Interconnection standards. The 
main goal of the OS1 reference model is 
to provide universal connectivity among 
heterogeneous computers. The refer- 
ence model is designed to structure com- 
munication hardware and software in a 
the RDA protocol, job transfers using 
the JTM (job transfer and manipula- 
tion) protocol, a virtual terminal using 
the VT protocol, and transaction pro- 
cessing using the TP protocol. 
To achieve reliable and fault-tolerant 
computing in open distributed systems, 
the ASEs use the commitment, concur- 
rency, and recovery (CCR) services pro- 
vided by a special ASE called the CCR 
protocol.4 CCR is a standard two-phase 
commit protocol that provides the ser- 
vices needed to achieve concurrency 
control and recovery during execution 
of application layer tasks such as FTAM, 
TP, VTP, etc. Figure 1 shows the OS1 
communication model and the interac- 
tions among the ASEs of the applica- 
tion layer. 
Architectural support 
for FTODS 
In this section we identify features 
that should be supported by the com- 
puting modules of open distributed sys- 
tems to facilitate an efficient implemen- 
tation of fault-tolerant algorithms. On 
the basis of this criteria, we propose an 
organization for fault-tolerant open dis- 
FTODS computing module capabilities 
tributed systems, the architecture of its 
building blocks, and the required algo- 
rithms and protocols. The architecture 
of the computing modules should sup- 
port reliable broadcasting, self-repair/ 
recovery, selective fault tolerance, and 
permanent memory (see the sidebar 
“FTODS computing module capabili- 
ties”). 
Organization of the FTODS. An 
FTODS comprises a set of computing 
modules we refer to as nodes. Nodes 
communicate and interact with each 
other by broadcasting their messages 
on a redundant broadcast medium. A 
The architecture of the computing modules should faciltate erations in a Sault-tolerant mode and tile rest in a normal 
the efficient implementation of fault-tolerant dgorithms. This mode. This will lead to a signfficant imprcwement in peIfOf- 
architectural support can be provid%d by the following capa- mance without compromising the fault-tdtrrance fequife- 
bilities: ments. Conseguentiy, the arGh&otur% Of the computing mod- 
Reliabk brcmdmksttng. Reliable broac&asting provides ules should support ~~~~,r~gu~~~n such that the 
means for a set of procasses to communicate in spite of fail- processors Mthin a nod% can be canfigured for use as a 
ures and is used frequently as a priiitive operation to fmple- masking redundancy during eMGal operations and as a muiti- 
ment reliable distributed appliGation8.l it has been shown that 
processor system during noftG&Gal operations. This capabifi- 
reliable broadcasting provides an efficient soft&ion to many 
ty has been supported by the G.vmp, which contairis three 
problems - for example, distributed consensus, distributed processor-memory pairs that can operate independently and 
synchronization, replicated update; and transaction manage- can also providot fault-&&rant 0p%rations.4 
ment in database systems.* Furthermore, theee r&able pfo- HhmmhW pmnaqemt nxmwy aystesn. Most fecrrvsry 
tocols will run efficiently on the underlying architecture if its 
communication n%twGrk has a broadcast capab&ty. 
aigofithms needed to a~M?v% @Moferant computing rety on 
permanent storage.’ St&&e st%f&ge is usad to stofe the 
S%if-~6pai~ke~ov%~. Recovery in distributed systems with chsckpoints of a system stat%: these ch%ekpoints will b% used 
replicated resourcss, GOmputatlons, and database systems is to restore the system to the previous faoft-free checkpoint 
a nontrivial task. Moreover, the ov&!%ad of recovery can de- state when a failure oc~ufs duthtg normal operation. Stable 
grade system performanc% significantiy.2 Hardware recovery storage is normally COnStrUCted using dual magnetic disks. 
blocks have been proposed to reduce overtmad during the 
Performance of fautt-tolerant algorithms Gan be improved sig- 
save operations of system state &nd to speed up recovery nificantly if stab& morage is implemented in a twa-tevel hier- 
when faults are de&&d in a mu&iproG%ssor sy&%m.3 The tit- arGhy in which sem&8nd&tGtor plsrnranen memory is used in 
erature is rich with techniqt#s that can be used ttj support the first level and magnrttic permanent memory is us%d in the 
self-repair and reG0vef-y. For exampie, the us% of static re- second. The SPM acts ae a buffef b%twe%n the professor 
dundancy.to achieve fault masking has been used in’the and the t&PM. 
c.vmp (computer-voted multiprocessor) computer.* Atso, Kuhl 
and Reddy” have addressed fauft,diagnosis at the system ft%fer%nG%s 
level and the conditions under which nodes cefl diagnose the 
failure of other nodes to achieve s&f-test. 1. u&ributed Sy&ms, 8. MutMUer, ed., Add&on-Wesley, Read- 
The architecture of the computrng modules should support tng, Mass., 1989. 
a hierarchical approach for r%cOv%ry such that mbst of the 2. 
time-consuming tasks are ex%Gut%d at a lower level of this hi- 
J. Chang and f&F. MsxemBwk, uRs&bts 6roatlcast Protocols, 
ACM Tams. Com@#er @@ems, VG~. 2, No. 3, Aug. 1984, pp. 
erarchy. The use of staticz (masking) redundancy and diag- 
nostic routines simpl@iis the tasks involved in fault detection, 
self-reconfiguration and repair, and recovery. Providing the 
computing modules with these features cot&d sign$fkant#y re- 
251-273. 
3. Y.-H. Ies and KG. Shfn, Qestgn and Evaluation of a Fault-Toler- 
ant ~~ Using ~s~~~ EfJocks,” MZE 
Tram Computers, V#. G33,No. 2, Feb. lm, pp. t13-124. 
duce the complexity of recovery at the application Isvel. With 
the proliferation of VLBI chips, I/O processors, eontiolters, 
and memory, it is now reasonable to use redundant compo- 
nents in designing th8 computing modules. 
Sekstive fault tobrane. Since not all task operations re- 
4. D.P. Siswiorek and R.S. Swsrz, The Theow and Pracrice of Reli- 
ebbs system Lwgn, @gital Press, Seuford, Maas., 1982. 
5. J.G. Kuhl and SM. F&d&y, %sutt4.Xsgnosis in Fully Distrsbutetd 
Systems,” Pm@. 1 l@ Iti‘i SJM~P. Fs&-Toisrsnt Gompuffi@ IEEE 
CS Press, Los A&m&s, C&if., Order No. 350 (microfiche only), 
quite fault tolerance, it is desirabIe to run on[y the critical op- June 1981, pp. lOO-f05. 
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Cluster  1  
.I +  Intercluster bus  I ________________________________________-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - . . . - - - - - - - - - - - - - . - - - - - - - - - - - - - . - - - ,  Cluster  n  
F igure  2. Organ iza t ion  of the fault- tolerant o p e n  distr ibuted system. 
F igure  3. N o d e  archi tecture. 
5 4  
set ot n o d e s  to rms a  cluster. A  cluster 
(C,) commun ica tes  with another  c luster 
(C,) th rough the ga teway assoc ia ted with 
each  cluster (see  F igure  2). 
N o d e  archi tecture. E a c h  n o d e  hassev-  
e ra1  process ing  e lements  wh ich  can  b e  
conf igured dynamica l ly  to fo rm ei ther  a  
redundant  comput ing  m o d u l e  o r  a  
shared-bus  mul t ip rocessor  system. The  
process ing  e lements  commun ica te  with 
each  other  v ia  a  redundant  n o d e  bus.  
Componen ts  of a  n o d e  (as  shown  in  
F igure  3)  inc lude a  genera l -pu rpose  
microprocessor ,  a n  input/output system, 
a n d  bus  contro l ler  subsystems.  The  n u m -  
ber  of p rocess ing  e lements  n e e d e d  at 
each  n o d e  depends  o n  the rel iabi l i ty 
a n d  faul t - to lerance requi rements .  A  
n o d e  has  two operat iona l  modes :  fault 
to lerant a n d  mul t iprocessing.  For  non -  
cri t ical tasks, a  n o d e ’s processors  can  b e  
conf igured as  a  shared-bus  mul t ipro-  
cessor  system. For  cri t ical tasks, the 
n o d e ’s processors  execute  the s a m e  task 
synchronous ly  a n d  use  a  vot ing p roce-  
du re  to m a s k  out  the effect of faulty 
processors.  The  coord inator  p rocessor  
(P,),  wh ich  is chosen  f rom the set of 
fault- free processors  accord ing  to apre -  
def ined select ion procedure ,  superv ises  
the vot ing a lgor i thm a n d  commun ica -  
t ion with other  nodes.  
H ie ra rch ica lpermanentmemory .  Pe r -  
manen t  m e m o r y  prov ides  secure  data 
s torage for the state of a  n o d e  a n d  any  
other  in format ion re levant  to the exe-  
cut ion of a  transact ion. Consequent ly ,  
it is poss ib le  to commi t  the t ransact ion 
atomical ly  o r  u n d o  al l  its act ions shou ld  
that t ransact ion b e  abor ted.  Pe rmanen t  
m e m o r y  can  b e  imp lemen ted  us ing  m a g -  
net ic o r  semiconduc tor  technology.  F ig-  
u re  4  shows  the organizat ion of the h ier -  
arch ica l  pe rmanen t  m e m o r y  (HPM) ,  
wh ich  uses  a  semiconduc tor  pe rmanen t  
m e m o r y  ( S P M )  at the first level  a n d  
magnet ic  pe rmanen t  m e m o r y  ( M P M )  
at the second  level.  The  S P M  conta ins 
two bat tery-backup R A M  units, a  com-  
parator  unit, a n d  severa l  bus  interface 
units. The  M P M  consists of dua l  m a g -  
net ic d isks a n d  a  comparator .  
In the p roposed  H P M , the S P M  acts 
as  a  buffer be tween the coord inator  p ro-  
cessor  of a  n o d e  a n d  the M P M ; as  a  
result,  the H P M  unit’s effective access 
tim e  is reduced.  The  coord inator  p ro-  
cessor  of a  n o d e  updates  the S P M  a tom-  
ical ly accord ing  to the fo l lowing proce-  
dure:  
C O M P U T E R  
(1) After obtaining a majority con- 
sensus on the data to be committed, the 
coordinator processor places the data 
on the node bus with a write signal. 
(2) The values from the bus are writ- 
ten into the two semiconductor memo- 
ries simultaneously. 
(3) The comparator module immedi- 
ately reads back and compares the up- 
dated locations. 
(4) If the values differ, an abort sig- 
nal is sent to the coordinator processor 
via the node bus indicating that the 
values need to be rewritten. This pro- 
cess can be repeated up to a predefined 
number of times before an error signal 
is generated. If the comparison opera- 
tion produces a match, then the updat- 
ed values are committed and an appro- 
priate signal is sent to the coordinator 
processor. 
Figure 5 is a flowchart describing an 
atomic write operation. Error detection 
and correction codes can also be used to 
increase the reliability and simplify the 
diagnosis of the memory system. How- 
ever, coding techniques alone cannot 
provide fault tolerance against crashes 
of memory devices. A similar proce- 
dure is used for a read operation. In 
addition to the fault-tolerance capabil- 
ity hierarchical permanent memory pro- 
vides, its use also improves the perfor- 
mance of recovery protocols. 
Cluster coordinator and gateway. For 
each set of nodes forming a cluster (C,), 
there is a node designated as the cluster 
coordinator (C,). The nodes of a cluster 
are ordered in a predetermined priority 
list so that any fault-free node knows 
the procedure for selecting the C, node. 
The C, node periodically receives status 
messages from the nodes in its cluster. 
Also, the C, supervises the recovery 
procedure when one of its nodes is in a 
crashed state. A cluster’s gateway for- 
wards all messages routed to nonlocal 
nodes through the gateways connected 
to the intercluster communication link. 
The remote gateways pick up the mes- 
sages addressed to one of their nodes. 
Selective fault-tolerance capability. 
Redundancy and fault-tolerant algo- 
rithms are used to ensure atomic execu- 
tion of critical tasks and system recov- 
ery when faults occur. For example, 
updating a bank account is a critical 
task, and its execution should be con- 
trolled by a commit protocol. In this 
June 1992 
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Figure 4. Hierarchical permanent memo] rY* 
case, the critical operations are those 
that update the bank accounts. Howev- 
er, there are other operations that do 
not affect the system consistency re- 
quirements (reading a set of records, 
searching the database, etc.), so they do 
not need a commit protocol to control 
their execution. 
Since critical operations constitute 
only a small part of all the operations, 
redundancy in the architecture can be 
exploited to improve performance 
through parallel processing. However, 
for a node to operate in two modes - 
redundant mode and multiprocessing 
mode-the system should provide tech- 
niques for reconfiguration. 
Support for two processing modes is 
provided by monitors. A monitor is a 
layer of software embedded above the 
operating system. The tasks are repre- 
sented using a graph whose nodes rep- 
resent computational structures and 
whose arcs represent the dependency 
constraints between the computations. 
Critical tasks are distinguished from 
noncritical tasks using system primitives 
and semantics of the computation. The 
monitor maintains a queue of ready tasks 
that can be executed concurrently as 
soon as a processor is available. The 
monitor schedules the tasks in a first-in, 
first-out manner. However, scheduling 
Abort 
Same 
Commit 
Figure 5. An atomic write operation. 
must incorporate execution of critical 
tasks, since they require all the proces- 
sors on a node. 
Two scheduling schemes can be used 
for scheduling critical tasks. The first 
uses preemptive scheduling in which a 
critical task to be scheduled preempts 
all other tasks. When the monitor rec- 
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ognizes that the next task is critical, it 
preempts the tasks on other processors. 
In the second scheme, the monitor waits 
for all current tasks to complete before 
scheduling a critical task, and it does 
not schedule any noncritical tasks dur- 
ing that period, even if processors are 
available. The first scheme has the ad- 
vantage that critical tasks are complet- 
ed as soon as possible. But the overhead 
of preempting tasks can be significant 
because the state of all the current pro- 
cesses must be saved. The second scheme 
does not require saving the states of the 
current processes, but the processors 
may remain idle for a long period, re- 
ducing utilization and throughput. 
Distributed voting algorithm. In our 
analysis, we assume that a faulty pro- 
cessor either stops producing data (fail- 
stop model) or produces corrupted data 
that the voting algorithm can recognize 
and use as a symptom of a faulty proces- 
sor. Processor faults can be caused by a 
malfunction of its hardware and/or soft- 
ware. A processor can assume only two 
states: faulty or fault free. During the 
fault-tolerance mode of operation, a 
node’s processors are configured to ex- 
ecute the same task (static redundancy) 
and the system memory is reconfigured 
as a hierarchical permanent memory. A 
coordinator processor (PC) is associated 
with each node. The PC supervises the 
distributed voting algorithm and com- 
mits the tasks’ execution. Selection of 
the P, follows a predefined procedure. 
For example, if each processor is identi- 
fied by a number (ID), then PC can be 
selected as the fault-free processor with 
the maximum ID value. 
Figure 6 describes the voting algo- 
rithm and related procedures for distrib- 
uted voting in the FTODS environment. 
Each processor P, computes a result (or 
a set of results) that must be voted on 
before it can be committed. The func- 
tions used to compute these results de- 
pend on the application transactions. In 
phase 1, these results are computed and 
each Pi participating in the distributed 
computation broadcasts its results on 
the node bus using the broadcast primi- 
tive. Phase 2 involves voting on the re- 
sult and determines whether the result 
can be committed. Each Pi receives the 
values from all other Pi’s and indepen- 
dently determines the confidence in the 
values by comparing them. 
Each Pi in a node does the f&owing, (15 i 5 n) 
1. vote = function (“parameters”) /*computation de-pends on the appiication*/ 
2. broadcast (“node”, vote, P-name) /*broadcast “vote” to all proc&sors (P-name) in “node”*/ 
te, P-name) 1 I j I n, j f i /*rec. vote from all processors*/ 
/*Each Pi does the foliowinf 
vote01 = recv,msg (Pi, vo 
If (vote[i] = voteb]) Ff, 1 i i, j r; PI 
begin 
result = vote[i]; &es&# contains vote to be committed*/ 
vote-commit (“all”); /*vote commit with param *all”*/ 
end; 
else if (voteM = votetn) for at least k votes s.t. k r [n/21 
begin 
result = v?te of maj@y; I*resuit contains value of the majority*/ 
if ((Pi = PC) -and. (votefil f result)) /*if current coordinator not in majority*/ 
select-coordinator @$ e majority); /*select new coorditiator*l 
vote-commit (“rmajority”); /*commit the majority value*/ 
if (P, = P,) 
local-recovery (for all P, not in majority); /*start recovery of processors not in majority*/ 
end, 
else I*no majority *I 
b& 
Pi (status) = lacal_ctiegnostic (Pi), 1 S i s n /*start local diagnostics*/ 
if (Pi (status) = “okay”) 
begin 
select-coordinator (“node”); /*select new coordinator from “okay” processors*/ 
if (Pi = PC) /*new coordinator does the following*/ 
vote,tzmMt (new-majority); /*commit new majority*/ 
end; 
else if (P< (status) _ _ -If , .,,- - _-.-. --‘r _---------_.-- - ---- 
print (“comp&~ node failure, external recov&-y requi&d”); 
end. 
Figure 6. The distributed voting algorithm. 
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There can be three possible outcomes 
of this comparison. First, all values match 
with each other - a complete consen- 
sus. In this case, the coordinator proces- 
sor P, broadcasts the result to all P,‘s. 
Each P, acknowledges by sending a 
broadcast acknowledge message, and 
the result is written in the permanent 
memory. 
In the second outcome, only a major- 
ity is obtained on the result and the 
values of some P,‘s do not agree with 
that of the majority. In this case, there 
are two groups of processors, those be- 
longing to the majority and those that 
don’t. Since a majority is sufficient to 
commit a new value, the distributed 
voting algorithm (DVA) is executed such 
that it uses the majority result as the 
correct one. If the current coordinator 
is part of the majority, it coordinates the 
current DVA and initiates a recovery 
procedure for the P,‘s in the minority. If 
the current coordinator is not in the 
majority, then the P,‘s belonging to the 
majority select a new coordinator using 
the “select-coord()” procedure. This 
new coordinator now coordinates com- 
mit and recovery for the minority pro- 
cessors. 
In the third outcome, a majority is not 
obtained. This triggers the “self-diag- 
nostic()” procedure associated with each 
P,. The self-diagnostic procedure returns 
the status of each processor as either 
“okay” or “failed” (actually, obtaining 
anything other than “okay” implies 
“failed”). If none of the processors re- 
turn a status “okay,” the node (all II 
processors in the node) is considered 
“failed.” This requires external recov- 
ery, which the cluster coordinator will 
perform as part of the distributed node 
recovery algorithm. If some P,‘s are okay 
after the self-diagnostic procedure, they 
broadcast their status and then select a 
new coordinator from this new set. Vot- 
ing is repeated for the new set, and the 
recovery procedure is initiated for oth- 
er Pi’s. 
Distributed node recovery algorithm. 
One node is designated as the cluster 
coordinator (C,) for each cluster. Selec- 
tion of the C, follows a predefined pro- 
cedure similar to that used in selecting 
the P, of a node. 
Figure 7 describes the distributed node 
recovery algorithm. Each PC of a node 
periodically broadcasts a status mes- 
sage on the local broadcast medium. 
The current C, checks the status of all 
node coordinators. If any node is crashed 
and does not send a status message to 
the C,, the C, copies the state of that 
node as well as the node’s task-queue. 
It then assigns these tasks to other nodes 
in the cluster, choosing nodes with the 
minimum load. If a node that crashed 
earlier has recovered and sends an 
“okay” message to the C,, the C, up- 
dates its own record to reflect this 
Each PC, (node coordinator) in a cluster does the following, (15 i I m) 
Forever do /*periodically*/ 
broadcast (LLcluster”, ststus, PC) /*broadcast “status” to all node coordinators in the cluster*/ 
I&The cluster coordinator is one of the node coordinators*/ 
recv,msg (PC,, status, P-name) 1 5 j I rn, j # i /*rec. status from all node coordinators*/ 
If (PC, = C,) /*if I am the cluster coordinator*/ 
begin 
For (i = 1 tom) do /*check status of all nodes*/ 
If (status (PC,) f “okay”) /*any failed node?*/ 
begin 
state = Read (PC,, state-block) /*read the state of Pci from its I-IPM*/ 
task-queue = Read (PC,, task-queue) /*Obtain the tasks of PC,*/ 
Pq = select (m&load, cluster) /*choose a node with minimum load currently*/ 
Send (PC+, state) /*copy state of crashed node to the chosen node*/ 
Send (PC, task-queue) /*assign tasks to the new node*/ 
ret,status (PcJ = failed /*record this with C,*/ 
recover (PC,) /*recover the crashed node by copying updated information*/ 
/*this recovery may not always be possible if the failed node’s hardware needs to be replaced (i.e., if catastrophic 
failure oecurred)*I 
end; 
else if ((status (PC,) = okay) -and. (ret-status (PC,) = failed)) /*PC, was repaired but record was not*/ 
ret-status (Pci) = okay /*update C, record*/ 
end, 
else if (PC, f C,> /*if I am not the cluster coordinator*/ 
if (status (C,) f “okay”) /*the cluster coordinator failed*/ 
select-ciuster-coordinatoro; /*select new cluster coordinator*/ 
end. 
Figure 7. The distributed node recovery algorithm. 
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Procedure vote-commit (parameter: set-processor); 
/*set-processor: a list of processors that are fault-free, e.g. all, majority etc.*/ 
if (Pi = PC) /*if E am the coordinator*/ 
begin 
broadcast (“set-processor”, result, P-name); /*reliable broadcast result to processors in “set-processor”*/ 
k = II set,processot II; I*cardinality of set-processor*/ 
forj=ltok 
tecv,msg (Pr E setsrocessor, beast-ack, P-name); /*rev. acknowledgment from processor in 
set-processor*/ 
exit; 
end, 
else if ((Pi r PJ -and. (Pi Q  set-processor)) /*other than coordinator processor*/ 
begin 
recv-msg (PC, result, P-name); /*rec. result from coordinator*/ 
beast-a& (PC, P-same); /*acknowledge to the coordinator*/ 
end; 
return; 
end vote-commit. 
Procedure select,mrdinator (parameter: set-processor); 
if (my-node (status) = “okay”) 
begin 
broadcast (set-processor, status, P-name); /*broadcast status*/ 
recv-msg (set-processor, status, P-name); /*rec. status from other processor*/ 
if (my-node = max (set-processor)) /*e.g. largest node-id */ 
mynode = P,; /*I am new coordinator*/ 
end; 
return; 
end select-coordinator 
Figure 8. Some procedures used in the distributed voting algorithm. 
change. If other node coordinators do 
not receive a status message from the 
C,, that is, if the C, itself failed, then 
node coordinators select a new C, fol- 
lowing a procedure similar to that for 
selecting a node coordinator (see Fig- 
ure 8). Once a new C, is selected, it 
repeats the above procedure to check 
for node failures. 
Implementation issues. The architec- 
tural support provided by the comput- 
ing modules of fault-tolerant open dis- 
tributed systems supports the trend 
toward open distributed systems. In 
FTODS, each computing module of a 
node has its own operating system and a 
runtime system that includes the dis- 
tributed voting algorithm, the distribut- 
ed node recovery algorithm, and the 
monitor (to schedule tasks and switch 
them between the two modes of opera- 
tion, and to do other housekeeping 
tasks). The fault-tolerance, concurren- 
cy control, and redundancy management 
algorithms use standard protocols and 
are implemented at the application lay- 
er as application service elements. In 
this environment, development of reli- 
able applications is significantly easier 
because they are not concerned with 
implementing the fault-tolerance, con- 
currency, and recovery techniques; these 
techniques are provided to the applica- 
tions as services by an ASE such as the 
CCR protocol. 
We can better understand this archi- 
tectural support by studying the main 
steps incurred during execution of a 
standard two-phase commit protocol 
(such as the CCR protocol). For exam- 
ple, to execute a transaction atomically, 
the master node running this transac- 
tion broadcasts a message (C-Begin) to 
all nodes involved in the transaction 
execution, indicating the beginning of 
an atomic execution. Since the underly- 
ing communication structure of FTODS 
supports broadcasting, we expect the 
transfer of the C-Begin message to be 
efficient. Once the C-Begin message is 
received at each slave node, the moni- 
tor switches to the fault-tolerant mode 
of operation, stores the system state in 
the hierarchical permanent memory, and 
checks the possibility of running the 
actions associated with the transaction. 
If an action can run successfully, the 
slave node sends an “okay” message 
(C-Prepare); otherwise, it sends a “fail- 
ure” status message (C-Refuse). 
Redundant execution of actions in 
the fault-tolerant mode, use of the dis- 
tributed voting algorithm with provi- 
sion to recover by itself, and use of two- 
level permanent memory will all 
contribute to improved performance, 
reliability, and fault tolerance. In the 
second phase, if the master node re- 
ceives a C-Prepare message from all 
the slave nodes, it commits the transac- 
tion by broadcasting the C-Commit mes- 
sage; otherwise, it broadcasts the C- 
Rollback message. Also, tasks in this 
phase will complete quickly because the 
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proposed architecture supports the 
broadcast capability and the rollback 
procedure. 
We believe that providing architec- 
tural support at the node level and using 
standard protocols will significantly sim- 
plify the development of reliable dis- 
tributed applications, thereby making 
open distributed systems an attractive 
computing environment. 
either case 1 or case 2, that is, f 5 N,, - 1. 
The expression for node reliability is 
obtained by computing the probability 
that at least one processor is operating 
successfully and is given by 
N,-1 
R, (N,) = C x Rbus c rNn-f (1 - r)’ 
f=O 
(1) 
Reliability analysis of 
FTODS 
Node reliability. Assume that r rep- 
resents the reliability of each processor 
for a given period of time T. This reli- 
ability measure should take into account 
the failures caused by hardware as well 
as by software. Detailed Markovian 
methods can be used to predict the com- 
bined reliability measure that takes into 
consideration hardware faults and soft- 
ware errors - for example, design er- 
rors related to system overloads, over- 
flow/underflow of queues, etc. Assume 
also that a processor failure is exponen- 
tially distributed with a failure rate h. 
Let the number of processors in a node 
be N,, and f denote the number of faulty 
processors at a given time t. Depending 
on the number of faults, the distributed 
voting algorithm uses different proce- 
dures, as follows: 
Case 1: Number of faultsf 5 rN,/21. In 
this case, a majority vote is attainable 
and the results obtained by the faulty 
processors can be masked out concur- 
rently by the coordinator processor with- 
out any extra delay. 
Case 2: Number of faults rN,,/2i If I 
N, - 1. In this case, the majority of 
processors are faulty. However, there is 
at least one fault-free processor that 
can be identified by the diagnostic rou- 
tines. This processor ensures reliable 
execution of the tasks assigned to its 
node, but with a time penalty that re- 
sults from invoking the local diagnostic 
procedures. 
Cuse3: Number of faults f = N,. In this 
case, all processors of a node are faulty; 
consequently, the node is in a failed 
state. The cluster coordinator invokes 
the distributed node recovery proce- 
dure to start a higher level recovery 
procedure, as previously described. 
Node reliability can thus be defined 
as the probability of the node’s being in 
is the binomial factor and is given by 
N,,! 
(Nn-f)!f! 
In the above expression, the term 
rNn -1 denotes the probability of having 
N,, - f fault-free processors, while (1 - ry 
denotes the probability of having f faulty 
processors. The 
NH ( 1 f 
denotes the number of combinations in 
which there are f faulty processors cho- 
sen from N,, in a node. If the coverage 
factor is equal to one, the node can be 
viewed as a parallel redundant system 
with a redundancy level of N,, Node 
reliability can be evaluated as (1 - 
(1 - r)Nn). 
Node reliability can be expressed with 
respect to time, if we assume that the 
processors fail according to an expo- 
nential distribution function with a fail- 
ure rate h. Consequently, node reliabil- 
ity at a given time t is given by 
(exp-‘)Nn-f(l-exp-h’)f 
(2) 
Coverage C is an important parameter, 
and system reliability is extremely sen- 
sitive to its value. The coverage factor 
reflects the system’s ability to recover 
automatically from a fault once it oc- 
curs during normal operation. It de- 
pends on the techniques used to detect, 
mask, locate, and repair faults, and to 
reconfigure and recover from the ef- 
fects of a failure. The methods used to 
predict coverage are therefore based on 
assumptions about the expected behav- 
ior of faults and how they are handled 
once they occur. Dugan and Trivedi5 
presented several methods for predict- 
ing the coverage factor for different 
types of error behavior assumptions. In 
FTODS, a distributed voting algorithm 
is used to detect faulty processors and 
to mask their errors dynamically. There- 
fore, no recovery is needed as long as a 
majority vote can be obtained (case 1). 
Also, this algorithm uses a redundant 
system bus for comparing the results 
obtained by the processors. Since there 
is no single point of failure in the FTODS 
architecture and in the fault-tolerant 
algorithms, the coverage C is expected 
to be high; in this analysis it is assumed 
to be 1. 
A node’s mean time to failure can 
also be evaluated from the above ex- 
pression (Equation 2) by integrating 
the node reliability expression: 
MT-IF = j’,Y;Rn 
To measure the reliability improvement 
as a result of introducing redundancy, 
we define a measure called the reliabil- 
ity improvement factor (RIF). This 
measure describes the relative increase 
in reliability for using N,, redundant pro- 
cessors to the maximal possible increase 
in reliability. Let’s assume that R,,(l) 
denotes the simplex reliability of a node. 
The maximal increase in reliability is 
obtained when R,(l) is increased to 1. 
The RIF for a given redundancy level 
(N,,) is computed as 
RIF = R,(NJ-R,(l) 
l-R,(l) 
Figure 9 shows the RIF obtained for 
three different levels of redundancy (3, 
4, and 5). In this analysis, the reliability 
of a simplex bus is assumed to be a 
constant and equal to 0.95, because we 
are interested in studying the effect of 
redundancy level on node reliability. It 
is clear that more than 95 percent of 
the possible reliability improvement can 
be achieved when four processors are 
used. However, a triple modular re- 
dundancy configuration (level 3) could 
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Figure 9. The effect of redundancy level on node reliability. 
be sufficient for situations in which 
the processor’s initial reliability is high. 
The same analysis can be used to mea- 
sure the improvement in the MTTF 
when different redundancy levels are 
used. 
Reliability analysis of an atomic trans- 
action. Let T denote a transaction with 
a collection of iz actions, that is, T = a,, 
a2,..., a,, where a, represents an action 
to run on a node. 
The set of nodes that run the actions 
of a given transaction (T) and the set of 
links connecting them form a tree re- 
ferred to in CCR protocol as an atomic 
action tree. An AAT is assumed opera- 
tional when all its components (nodes 
and links) are operational. 
Figure 10 shows a transaction consist- 
ing of three actions a,, a2, and a, in which 
each action can run redundantly on two 
nodes of a cluster. In this example, ac- 
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tion a, can run on node x, or xZr a, can 
run on node xj or x.,, and a3 can run on x5 
or x6, Because of this redundancy, eight 
possible trees can be used to run this 
transaction: 
AAT,=x 4 x x x x x 9 b, 4 gl gz x xxx 1 3 5 g3 
AAT, =xb,Xb2Xb~Xb4Xg,Xg2Xg~X1X3X6 
AAT,=x 4 x x x b4 x x b, b, 81 gz x xxx 1 4 5 gi 
AAT4=xqXb~Xb,Xb~~g,~gZXg,X1x4X6 
AAT,=x 4 x x x b4 x x bz 4 81 gz x xxx 2 3 5 a 
~~~6=xqxb~Xb~Xba,Xg,XgzXg~X2X3X6 
AAT,=x 4 x x x x x 9 b3 b4 g, gz x xxx 2 4 5 a 
AAT,=x x x x x x x xxx k b, b, b4 gi gz 83 2 4 6 
Transaction reliability (TR) can be 
defined as the conditional probability 
that at least one of these trees is opera- 
tional. The literature is rich with algo- 
rithms to evaluate this probability, and 
if we apply the Syrel algorithm,6 TR can 
be given as 
+ rlr4r5q3 + rlr4r6w5 + r2r3r59, 
+ rzr3r6wh + r2r4r5w3 + r2r4r69d3951 
where qi denotes the unreliability of 
node i and is equal to (1 - r,). 
A transaction’s reliability can be in- 
creased by introducing redundancy so 
that its actions can be executed on sev- 
eral processors. Redundant execution 
of actions can be performed on proces- 
sors located at remote nodes, all at one 
node, or a combination of these two 
cases. For the network shown in Figure 
10, the transaction reliability is ana- 
lyzed for the following three cases: 
Case I: Execution of redundant ac- 
tions at remote nodes. In this case, each 
node has only one processor and the 
actions are executed on remote nodes. 
Concurrency control and redundancy 
management are complicated because 
of the remote distribution of the redun- 
dant computations. 
Case 2: Execution of redundant ac- 
tions at local nodes. In this case, each 
node has four redundant processors that 
can concurrently execute an action of T. 
Since all of the redundant computa- 
tions run on the processors of the same 
node, concurrency control and redun- 
dancy management are simplified sig- 
nificantly. 
Case 3: Execution of redundant ac- 
tions on remote redundant nodes. This 
is a combination of the first two cases. 
Figure 11 shows the transaction reli- 
ability for these three cases. Note that 
the transaction reliability for the sec- 
ond case is better than that of case 1. 
However, case 2 has twice as many re- 
dundant processors as case 1. Further- 
more, there is no significant improve- 
ment in reliability for case 3 over case 2 
in spite of the fact that case 3 uses twice 
the redundancy of case 2. Moreover, 
the algorithms needed to achieve con- 
currency control and redundancy man- 
agement in case 3 are more complicated 
than those of case 2 because the redun- 
dant actions run on both local and re- 
mote nodes. 
From this analysis, we can conclude 
that replicating the computations local- 
ly represents a cost-effective solution 
that maximizes reliability and also sim- 
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plifies the algorithms required to achieve 
recovery and consistency control. In 
FTODS, the computing modules are 
designed to provide architectural sup- 
port to run transactions in a configura- 
tion similar to that described in case 2. 
T he computing modules of the proposed FTODS support an efficient implementation of 
fault-tolerant algorithms. The use of 
static redundancy within each node guar- 
antees fault tolerance and reliable exe- 
cution of critical tasks. Furthermore, 
the use of local diagnostic routines to 
identify faulty components reduces the 
complexity of recovery algorithms sig- 
nificantly. alongwith trafficon the com- 
munications network, since these func- 
tions are executed using the processors 
available at a node. In transaction-pro- 
cessing-based distributed systems, per- 
manent memory is required for achiev- 
ing atomic transactions. In FTODS, the 
permanent memory is designed as a two- 
level hierarchy with semiconductor tech- 
nology used in the first level and mag- 
netic technology in the second. Providing 
semiconductor permanent memory im- 
proves performance significantly be- 
cause transactions can be committed 
much faster than by accessing magnetic 
disks. H 
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